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SAFE DRINKING WATER: A FEDERALISM PERSPECTIVE
A. DAN TARLOCK*
I. THE SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT AS PROTOTYPE "POST-MODERN"
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION
Since 1974, the United States has had strong federal regulation of
public drinking water. The Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA") of 19741
established national standards for water at the tap,' authorized land use
control demonstration programs to designate critical aquifer protection areas
for sole or primary source aquifers to prevent their contamination,3 and
regulated the injection of wastes and drilling fluids into the ground.4 In
response to slow Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
implementation,5 the SDWA was strengthened in 1986, 6 and reauthorized
and reformed in 1996. 7 Federal establishment of strong public drinking water
standards seems easy to justify and sustain; but after the 1986 Amendments,
the SDWA became increasingly controversial because of the fiscal burdens
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty, Chicago-Kent College of Law. A.B.
1962, LL.B. 1965 Stanford University. I gratefully acknowledge the support of the Marshall
T. Eule Research Fund in the preparation of this article. An earlier version of this paper was
presented at the William & Mary Environmental Law & Policy Review Environmental
Federalism Symposium, sponsored by The College of William & Mary School of Law,
Williamsburg, Virginia, on October 5, 1996.
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-9 (Supp. IV 1974).
2 See id. § 300g-1.
' See id. § 300h-6.
4 See id. § 300h-7.
' See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND
POLICY 597 (1996).
6 Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986 (1986 Amendments), Pub. L. No. 99-
339, 100 Stat. 642 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-1 1 (Supp. IV 1986)). The
technical name of the SDWA is the Public Health Service Act, because the original federal
involvement in the protection of public drinking water systems dates back to 1944. Public
Health Service Act, ch. 373, § 301, 58 Stat. 682, 691-92 (1944). The Act, however, is
universally referred to as the Safe Drinking Water Act, the formal name for the 1974
Amendments.
' Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, 110 Stat. 1613
(codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300fto 300j-25 (West Supp. 1996)).
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that it placed on all systems.8 Consequently, the reform debate partially
became a test of the power of many of the federalism criticisms of "first
generation," top-down, command and control environmental protection
legislation.9 Although the 1974 and 1986 Acts gave the states primary
enforcement responsibility if the state had adopted standards "no less
stringent than the national primary drinking water regulations"'" and had
adopted an adequate enforcement program," states and local water suppliers
sought greater flexibility to decide how safe drinking water should be, and at
the same time pleaded lack of financial capacity to comply with the SDWA.'2
In 1996, Congress reauthorized and amended the SDWA for the
8 See, e.g., Reilly to Meet with Governors to Consider 'Crisis' over Funding, State Privacy
Issues, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 645 (June 12, 1992); States Would Need 1993 Funding
Doubled to Implement Drinking Water Rules, EPA Says, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 3199 (Apr.
23, 1993).
9 First generation federal environmental legislation mandated maximum acceptable levels
of pollutants without regard to cost-benefit considerations. See, e.g., Richard J. Revesz,
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom " Rationale for
Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1214 n.7 (1992) (stating that
"[c]ommand and control regulation, which is prevalent under federal environmental statutes,
simply directs firms to produce no more than a given number of units of particular
pollutants"); A. Dan Tarlock, Local Government Protection of Biodiversity, 60 U. CHI. L.
REV. 555, 556 (1993) (noting that "[t]he first generation of environmental protection
programs concentrated on toxic risk reduction because of political pressure and its
amenability to New Deal command and control regulation").
'o 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2(a)(1) (1994). The 1996 Act amended § 300g-2 to strengthen state
primary enforcement powers by providing that a state with primary enforcement authority
with respect to existing national primary drinking water regulation shall have the same
authority over newly regulated contaminants. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-2(c) (West Supp. 1996).
" See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2(a)(2) (1994). Forty-nine out of 50 states have assumed primary
enforcement responsibility. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DRINKING WATER:
WIDENING GAP BETWEEN NEEDS AND AVAILABLE RESOURCES THREATENS VITAL EPA
PROGRAM 3 (1993); Tom Kenworthy, Water Inspections Called Lax, WASH. POST, June 29,
1996, at A27 (stating that Wyoming is the only state which has not assumed primary
enforcement responsibility).
12 See, e.g., States' Cash Shortfalls May Compromise Drinking Water Protection
Programs, GAO Says, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1144 (Aug. 7, 1992); States Constrained by
Lack of Funds to Meet Federal Standards, GAO Says, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 634 (Aug. 13,
1993).
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second time since its original passage in 1974.13 The SDWA Amendments
of 1996 ("Amendments") is the first major pollution regulatory program to
be reevaluated comprehensively, reformed, and reauthorized since the first
environmental decade ended in 1980.14 The Amendments represent an
attempt to deal with "second generation" environmental problems. Second
generation problems are characterized by the differential exposure to small
amounts of hazardous substances whose long-term adverse impacts are
uncertain, 5 but whose regulatory costs are substantial.16 The Amendments
can thus be understood on two levels: the immediate and the long-term. As
does all pollution control legislation, the final product reflects a political
compromise among different visions of risk protection entitlements.
However, the Amendments equally incorporate some of the lessons of a
"3 The SDWA was reauthorized and amended in 1986. H.R. REP. No. 104-632, at 6
(1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1366, 1371. Additionally, Congress simply
amended the SDWA in 1977, 1979, 1980, and most recently, in 1988. Id. at 5-6, reprinted
in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1370-71.
" The broad bipartisan consensus for environmental regulation ended with the election
of Ronald Reagan in 1980. See Jerry W. Calvert, Party Politics and Environmental Policy,
in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND POLICY 158, 158-59 (James P. Lester ed., 1989). During
the following decade, several major environmental programs were extended after extensive
efforts to roll them back, see, e.g., Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9674 (Supp.
IV 1986)), or to avoid the regulation entirely, see, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (Supp. II 1990)).
"s See, e.g., Mark E. Rushefsky, Elites and Environmental Policy, in ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS AND POLICY, supra note 14, at 262.
6 An official in EPA's Office of Regulatory Enforcement reported to a 1996 United
Nations Conference that:
Many of the small and very small public water systems experience
particular difficulties in complying with drinking water regulations.
Because they serve few people, they have a small rate base; therefore they
have little or no money for system improvements which may be required
due to the regulations ....
Lack of financial capability is not limited to the small and very
small systems. Many of the medium, large, and very large systems,
especially those owned and/or operated by municipalities ... have
difficulties raising revenue needed for major improvements.
Betsy Devlin, Protecting Drinking Water Quality Through the Clean Water Act and the Safe
Drinking Water Act, 1 FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL
COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT: CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 491, 497 (Jo Gerardu &
Cheryl Wasserman eds., 1996).
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quarter of a century of environmental management, especially with respect
to the allocation of risk assessment and management responsibility among
different levels of authority. These second generation adjustments are based
on four principal premises set out in section three of the 1996 Amendments.
First, small suppliers lack the financial capacity to comply with federal
standards. 7 Second, the maximum contaminant level ("MCL") and
maximum contaminant level goal ("MCLG") approach 8 established by the
1974 SDWA provides too much risk protection (too few health benefits)
compared to the costs of compliance. 9 Third, the process of contaminant
selection can be improved by "sound" science.2" Fourth, the appropriate level
of regulation can be improved by the application of "sound and objective
science"'" and benefit-cost analysis.22
Since initial pollution control responses were put in place in the
1970s, there have been important developments in the underlying science of
risk assessment and management, and in the capacity of states and local
governments to assume environmental protection responsibilities. However,
for the past fifteen years, the polarized politics of environmental protection
have made it difficult to apply these lessons in order to revise and adapt our
first generation programs to incorporate rationally the lessons we have
learned since the mythic late 1960s and early 1970s. The public has been
presented with the false choice of rolling back protection levels to restore the
pre-environmental decade status quo or holding on to past programs with
conservative risk assessments,23 regardless of their current rationality. One
of the most important lessons emerging from many environmental disputes
is the need to rethink the federalism models on which pollution control and
resource conservation programs were based in order to better tailor risk
assessment to specific geographic circumstances and to recognize the
'7 See Pub. L. No. 104-182, § 3(2), 110 Stat. 1613, 1614 (1996).
18 See infra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
'9 See Pub. L. No. 104-182, § 3(7), 110 Stat. at 1615 (stating that "in considering the
appropriate level of regulation for contaminants in drinking water, risk assessment.., and
benefit-cost analysis are important analytical tools for improving the efficiency and
effectiveness of drinking water regulations to protect human health").
20 See id. § 3(5).
21 Id. § 3(7).
22 See id.
23 See infra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 21:233
SAFE DRINKING WATER
inevitable trade-offs involved in risk protection.24
This article examines the way in which the current environmental
federalism debate influenced the Amendments. It challenges the widespread
assumption that toxic risk assessment and management to protect people
from involuntary exposure to hazardous substances is an exclusive national
responsibility because everyone has an equal entitlement to safety.25 Instead,
it argues that, like all resource allocation problems, there is a federalism
dimension to risk assessment. From this perspective, the Amendments
represent a mix of old and new federalism. They reflect both the current
criticisms of 1970s top-down cooperative federalism, such as the need to stop
unfunded federal mandates, to encourage private and public partnerships, and
to allow geographically-based risk assessments; 26 but they also reflect a new
shared entitlement federalism. The Amendments recognize that risk
assessment and management strategies need to incorporate a rule of reason
and local preferences as well as national risk assessments.27 But the
Amendments also reflect the older "Christmas Tree" cooperative federalism.
They shower money on states and local governments to plan, construct,
manage, and monitor improved public water systems that meet federal
standards.28  The Amendments also establish many new general
demonstration and other program grants,29 and grants targeted toward specific
24 See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever-Expanding Web of Federal
Laws Regulating Nonfederal Lands, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 555 (1995).
25 The ethical foundation of the idea that there is no entitlement to a risk free society is set
out in Mark Sagoff, Ethical and Economic Principles, in LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION § 5.04, at 5-62 to 5-63 (Sheldon M. Novick et al. eds., 1987).
26 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-14(a) (West Supp. 1996) (providing that states may
establish programs under which community water systems may petition a state to establish
source water quality protection partnerships among likely stakeholders).
27 See, e.g., id. § 300g-l(b)(6) (granting EPA the authority to promulgate MCLs that
"maximize health risk reduction benefits at a cost that is justified by the benefit").
28 See, e.g., id. § 300j-2(a)(7) (appropriating funds to finance state public water system
supervision programs); id. § 300j-3c (authorizing EPA to issue grants to finance the
construction, rehabilitation and improvement of water supply systems); id. § 300j-4(a)(2)(H)
(appropriating funds to finance state monitoring programs for unregulated contaminants).
29 See, e.g., id. § 300h-8 (authorizing EPA to distribute ground water protection grants);
id. § 300j-13 (directing EPA to establish source water quality assessments); id. § 300j-
14(c)(1) (authorizing grants to subsidize state programs to develop community water system
source water protection partnerships).
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geographic areas and constituencies.3"
II. FEDERALISM AND SAFE DRINKING WATER
Three models of environmental federalism have emerged since the
beginning of the modem environmental movement. Professor Hope
Babcock summarizes them as follows:
The first is the "dual regulation" or "state primacy" model,
under which states are administratively delegated regulatory
primacy to enforce federal laws through existing state laws
and institutions. The second is the "collaborative
management" or "consensus-based" model, under which a
joint federal, multi-state institution is created for the sole
purpose of developing consensus derived plans that will be
used by the various jurisdictions to manage federally
designated natural resources. The final model is the "layered
federalism" or "consistency" model, under which individual
states develop and administer natural resource management
plans with which proposed federal activities must be
consistent.3
A. The Historical Context of Federal Safe Drinking Water Protection
Since 1974, the federal government has regulated the public and
private provision of drinking water to ensure tap water meets minimum
quality standards. The Safe Drinking Water Act of 197432 is a product of the
30 See, e.g., id. § 300j-12(p) (authorizing use of revolving loan funds to finance
demonstration projects to investigate alternative approaches to financing new drinking water
facilities in rural southwestern Virginia); id. § 300j-16(b) (authorizing grants to improve
drinking water standards in colonias in Arizona, California, New Mexico and Texas). See
generally Jane E. Larson, Free Markets Deep in the Heart of Texas, 84 GEO. L.J. 179 (1995)
(discussing unregulated land use markets in the colonias).
"' Hope M. Babcock, Dual Regulation, Collaborative Management, or Layered
Federalism: Can Cooperative Federalism Models from Other Laws Save Our Public Lands?,
3 W.-NORTHWEST J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 193, 199 (1996).
32 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-9 (Supp. IV 1974).
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environmental decade which lasted roughly from 1969 to 1979.33 The legacy
of the first burst of environmentalism as a major political force was the
enactment of federal programs in areas where there was little effective state
regulation. These programs were enacted to assess the environmental impact
of federal activities, 34 to control the major sources of air and water pollution
through high national ambient and technology-forcing standards,35 and to
achieve the minimization of cancer and related risks from involuntary
exposure to toxic chemicals through national risk assessments and low
exposure standards.3 6 The 1974 SDWA began as a straightforward, science-
based public health protection program to complement the Clean Water Act,
which regulates only surface water quality, by protecting captive consumers
from exposure to a variety of contaminants.37
The 1974 SDWA, as amended by the 1986 Amendments, was
modeled after the Clean Water Act and is a classic cooperative federalism
statute.38 The 1974 SDWA envisioned that federal standards would be
implemented by all but the smallest domestic water providers.39 However,
drinking water protection became more difficult as the focus of the Act
shifted to protection of the public from enhanced cancer risks due to exposure
to toxic substances. It proved difficult to translate the science into effective
regulations4° and the EPA's expanded and multiple regulatory missions
" See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary
Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1157-63 (1995).
" See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (Supp. V
1969).
" See Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-18571(1970); Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. I 1972).
36 See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976).
17 See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b) (Supp. IV 1974). The major immediate health risks from
drinking water are untreated fecal organisms which transmit human pathogens. See I
WORLD HEALTH ORG., GUIDELINES FOR DRINKING-WATER QUALITY 8 (2d ed. 1993).
Carcinogenic chemical contaminants also present health risks but the risks are generally
smaller compared to microbial pollution.
18 See infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
" The national primary drinking water regulations applied to all public water systems,
with minor exceptions. See 42 U.S.C. § 300g. The SDWA defined a public water system
as any piped water system that had at least 15 service connections or that served at least 25
individuals. See id. § 300f(4).
40 See Kenneth Fairbanks Gray & Steven J. Koorse, Drinking Water, in LAW OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION § 16.01, at 16-2 to 16-3 (Sheldon M. Novick et al. eds.,
1987).
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hopelessly over-extended the agency.4" The problem of establishing effective
safe drinking water levels was exacerbated by the events of the second
decade of environmentalism. During the second decade, which coincided
with generally polarized environmental politics of the Reagan and Bush
administrations, 42 the economic and scientific rationality of many risk-based
regulatory programs was widely questioned, but the political climate was not
conducive to rational debate.43 The history of rational mid-course corrections
and reforms, which incorporate post-enactment knowledge, is therefore not
encouraging.
The debate over the rationality of risk-based environmental legislation
became intertwined with the bitter issue of whether environmental laws
should be rolled back, as close as possible, to pre-1970 levels, or extended to
guarantee a zero risk society.44 During the 1980s, efforts to roll back
environmental regulations were countered with political victories by
environmental coalitions that strengthened the fundamental structure of laws
such as the SDWA and CERCLA,45 but that did not reevaluate them.46 The
scientific weaknesses inherent in Congress' initial approach to risk
assessment, however, did not change. In the 1980s, Congress reacted to
EPA's slow enforcement of the SDWA by dictating an overly-ambitious
regulatory agenda for EPA through the use of strict statutory deadlines. 47 The
1986 Amendments are a classic example of the culture of regulatory failure
that has infected EPA almost since its creation.48 After a decade of extensive
41 See Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal
Environmental Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 311, 340-41.
42 See Calvert, supra note 14, at 158.
41 See id.
44 See Lazarus, supra note 41, at 320 (stating that EPA has found itself in a tug-of-war
between interests "wary of the economic costs of pollution control" and interests "favoring
a strong federal pollution effort").
45 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
46 See Lazarus, supra note 41, at 340-41 (commenting that, in reaction to EPA's failure
to comply with overly-ambitious statutory objectives and deadlines, Congress simply
"eliminated substantial EPA discretion, imposed more deadlines, and included more
prescription").
47 See id.
48 See id. at 321-42. "Congress responded to the perception of a national consensus in
environmental protection by passing a series of laws in the 1970s that set the stage for
institutional conflict and [EPA] failure." Id. at 323. Furthermore, "[a]mendments to the...
Safe Drinking Water Act ... during the 1980s... exhibit the same trend." Id. at 340-41.
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debate, Congress strengthened the Act by micro-managing EPA.49
B. The Structure of the Safe Drinking Water Act
Under the SDWA, the federal government establishes high national
safety standards which the states then implement." The EPA is authorized
to set national primary drinking water regulations.5 The standards are based
on two separate but related processes. First, EPA's Administrator is required
to establish non-binding MCLGs for any contaminant "which, in the
judgment of the Administrator, may have any adverse effect on the health of
persons and which is known or anticipated to occur in public water
systems."52 The MCLGs are set at double safety levels. The statute requires
that they "shall be set at the level at which no known or anticipated adverse
effects on the health of persons occur and which allows an adequate margin
of safety."53 MCLGs often are set at zero because the goal is based on
detectability levels.54 The Office of Drinking Water interpreted the 1986
Amendments as providing a zero or negligible cancer risk background
standard "with feasible detection technology acting as the key constraint on
regulatory stringency."55 For example, EPA's proposed Interim Enhanced
Surface Water Treatment Rule5 6 sets the MCLG level for Cryptosporidium
at zero.57
Second, the SDWA requires that the Administrator sets MCLs for
4 See id. at 341.
0 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-1, 300g-2.
5' See id. § 300g-l(b).
52 Id. § 300g-l(b)(3)(A).
3 Id. § 300g-l(b)(4).
14 See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (upholding EPA's use of zero MCLGs for known or probable carcinogens).
" Alon Rosenthal et al., Legislating Acceptable Cancer Risk From Exposure to Toxic
Chemicals, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 269, 310 (1992).
56 Enhanced Surface Water Treatment Requirements, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,832 (1991) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 141, 142) (proposed July 29, 1994).
" See id. at 38,839; see also Water Utility Group Expresses Concern on Lack of Science
in EPA Microbial Rule, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1145 (Sept. 20, 1996). Cryptosporidium is
the pathogen responsible for the contamination of Milwaukee, Wisconsin's water supply in
1993. See Enhanced Surface Water Treatment Requirements, 59 Fed. Reg. at 38,839;
Milwaukee Mayor Orders Tough Regulations Following Outbreak of Illness from Parasite,
23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 3205 (Apr. 23, 1993).
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each contaminant for which a MCLG is established.58 The Administrator
must set the MCLs "as close to the maximum contaminant level goal as is
feasible."59 MCLGs are thus the basis for establishing the national primary
drinking water regulations. MCLs are not expressly technology-forcing but
are set at a level which is feasible "with the use of the best technology,
treatment techniques and other means which the Administrator finds ... are
available (taking cost into consideration)."6 Variances are available, but
only if a public water system ("PWS") is unable to comply with the national
primary drinking water regulations "after the system's application of the best
technology, treatment techniques, or other means, which the Administrator
finds are available."'" MCLGs and MCLs are thus backed-up by the
establishment of the best available technology for treatment facilities.62 In
1986, Congress also mandated two treatment techniques: filtration for
surface water sources 63 and disinfection for ground water sources. 64
C. Shifting Currents in Pollution Control Federalism
Strong federal environmental programs were initially enacted to
counter state political reluctance and the lack of regulatory capacity to
implement programs, 65 but conditions have somewhat changed since the first
environmental decade. State subordination to federal initiatives was
supported by the post-New Deal principles of federalism and by the Supreme
Court's federalism jurisprudence. Prior to the New Deal, the constitutional
assumption was that regulatory power or competence must be exclusive
either to the national government or to the states in order to protect individual
" 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(4).
59 Id.
60 Id. § 300g-l(b)(5).
61 Id. § 300g-4(a). Following enactment of the 1996 Amendments, variances are available
for small systems, except for pre-1986 MCLs and national drinking water regulations for
microbial contaminants. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-l(e) (West Supp. 1996).
62 See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(5) (1994); Gray & Koorse, supra note 40, § 16.03[1][d], at
16-16.
63 See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(7)(C)(I).
64 See id. § 300g-l(b)(8).
65 See Oliver A. Houck, The Water, the Trees, and the Land, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2279, 2285
(1996).
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liberty through the diffusion of regulatory power.66 The Court's rigid dual
federalism subordinated the Marshallian notion of a strong national
government to deal with new problems at the time when it was most
relevant.67 Eventually, however, federal power was expanded through broad
readings of the Commerce Clause and the implied preemption doctrine.68
During the New Deal, dual federalism was replaced with a defacto
presumption that federal regulation was necessary and the gradual realization
that political rather than judicial federalism was the best means to achieve the
constitutionally contemplated balance between the states and the national
government.69 The fruit of this non-dual federalism was the theory of
cooperative or "marble cake" federalism,7" which underlies federal pollution
programs. In cooperative federalism, the states become agents of the national
government.7' The principal focus of constitutional law thus shifted from
concern about the infringement of reserved state authority to an inquiry into
the congressional intent behind the preemption of state regulatory authority.72
6 See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1561-62
(1988) (locating the "checking" function of federalism in both classic republican and
pluralist political theory); see also Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE
L.J. 1425, 1492-1519 (1987) (arguing that the purpose of federalism is to create inter-
governmental competition to protect individual rights grounded in popular sovereignty).
67 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 307-08 (2d ed. 1988).
68 See id. at 308-11, 479-83.
69 See Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REv. 795,
795 (1996).
70 The term "'marble cake' federalism" was coined by Morton Grodzins. MORTON
GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
8 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1966).
" The Supreme Court has recently limited cooperative federalism. See New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166-69 (1992) (rejecting cooperative federalism except in
limited circumstances where the federal government preempts state regulation or conditions
federal grants upon state adoption of federal regulations).
72 The tradition of concern for state prerogatives, however, endures. See Deborah J.
Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 17-22 (1988) (expressing support for state rights and maintenance of the
federalist structure); Robert F. Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League
of Cities in Perspective, 1981 SUP. CT. REv. 81, 107-10; see also Lynn A. Baker,
Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1911 (1995). But see David
A. Dana, The Case for Unfunded Environmental Mandates, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1995)
(arguing that unfunded mandates are the result of accountable political processes). See
generally Symposium, Federalism's Future, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1205 (1994) (addressing the
future roles of states and the federal government).
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In the past fifteen years many of the original assumptions behind
cooperative federalism have changed, for both ideological and empirical
reasons. Ideologically, we are in a period of ascendant state power and
declining vigor of the national government. Federalism theory and the
Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence, such as it is, reflect this shift and
oscillate between radically different views on the merits of a strong national
government. Contemporary views range from the theory that states are the
central guardians of liberty7 3 against the Leviathan to the view that states are
historical accidents, and thus the displacement of state law (or states) by
Congress raises "no normative principle... that is worthy of protection.
7 4
The immediate consequence of the shifting nature of federalism
jurisprudence for public health protection is that post-New Deal federalism
has in turn decayed into an abstract, fragile, and often dysfunctional balance
between national and subordinate authority. This balance is reflected in the
Supreme Court's new neo-dual federalism jurisprudence which is
increasingly incoherent75 and disconnected from the reality of emerging
patterns of multi-level public and private cooperation to address
environmental problems.
Supreme Court federalism doctrines in many ways exacerbate the
tension between the allocation of local and national risk assessment
"prerogatives" because the essence of a constitutional federal system is the
firm division of power between the national government and the states. This
" Professor Akhil Amar is a leading proponent of this view. See Amar, supra note 66;
Akhil R. Amar, Five Views of Federalism: "Converse-1983" in Context, 47 VAND. L. REV.
1229 (1994).
7 Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis,
41 UCLA L. REv. 903, 909 (1994).
"5 This decay can be traced in the Supreme Court's preemption jurisprudence which has
evolved from a weak to a strong formal preference for concurrent regulatory authority.
Compare Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (ruling that absent a conflict
with federal law, states may regulate matters not regulated by a federal act), with Pacific Gas
& Elec. Co. v. California State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190, 205 (1983) (allowing concurrent state and federal regulation of disposal of nuclear
waste), and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, 479 U.S. 130 (1986) (allowing
concurrent state and federal taxation of goods stored in customs-bonded warehouses). The
Court's application of the presumption remains hopelessly incoherent. Compare Wisconsin
Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1991) (holding that federal pesticide law does not
preempt local regulation of pesticide application), with Gade v. National Solid Wastes
Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992) (holding that the Occupational Safety and Health
Act preempts state hazardous waste licensing scheme).
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division either is based on a constitutional scheme of power fragmentation or
is justified as a means to match problems with competent jurisdictions.76 In
our constitutional system, the emphasis has been on the establishment of
negative liberties77 or the location of regulatory competence. Federalism, as
interpreted by a narrow majority of the current Supreme Court, is erroneously
thought to require that allocations of power between the federal government
and the states be exclusive to protect the states from the federal government.78
This search bears little resemblance to the functional allocations demanded
by geographic realities and ignores increasingly important players such as
local governments, regional agencies, and private parties.
There have been three primary "real" changes in the federalism of
public health protection since the environmental decade. First, we have a
clearer understanding that risk assessment is a much more complicated
process than originally assumed. Our understanding of the causes of cancer
has changed over the course of time.79 We now realize more clearly that the
numbers generated by risk assessments are highly variable and often bear
little, if any, relationship to actual improvements in public health." Thus, the
ultimate level of risk protection for exposure to contaminants in drinking
76 See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids ofSacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALEL.J. 1196, 1225-31 (1977)(writing before National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), was overruled in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), and identifying three
bases for national pollution control regulation: (1) the promotion of intrastate welfare; (2)
the prevention of interstate spillovers; and (3) the implementation of national moral ideals).
" See Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1503 (1988) (stating that
negative liberty "refers to absence of restraint against doing as one wants").
" See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (holding,by a five to four
vote, that sections of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, which authorized Indian
tribes to sue states in federal court if states fail to negotiate in good faith to reach a compact
on gaming activities, violated the Eleventh Amendment); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144 (1992) (holding, by a six to three vote, that the "take title" provision of the Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, which obligated states either to
take title of radioactive waste generated in-state or to adopt federal regulations, violated the
Tenth Amendment). See generally Gardbaum, supra note 69, at 796.
" For an insightful analysis of the scientific and sociological history of the use of dose-
response curves in laboratory animals and the "one hit" theory to explain the risks of cancer
from exposure to toxic chemicals, see ROBERT N. PROCTOR, CANCER WARS: How POLITICS
SHAPES WHAT WE KNOW AND DON'T KNOW ABOUT CANCER 153-73 (1995).
" See Mark Elliot Shere, The Myth of Meaningful Environmental Risk Assessment, 19
HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 409 (1995).
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water cannot be dictated by numbers alone but is a social judgment in which
both expert and ordinary consumer opinion is relevant and which may vary
geographically.
Second, the legitimate limits of federal effectiveness are recognized
more clearly. The maintenance of national pollution protection floors
supplemented by stricter state standards works,8 but high federal standards
are often insensitive to the regional variations in drinking water quality and
treatment operations. More generally, cooperative federalism has proven
better in theory than in practice as the New Deal faith in the need for national
solutions has rapidly eroded in the past twenty years.8 2 Instead of cooperative
or "marble cake" federalism, we now have either prefectorial federalism,1
3
characterized by federal mandates without the necessary financial incentives
to induce state compliance with them, or neo-dual federalism,84 which seeks
to compartmentalize governmental functions which should in fact should be
shared. Both result in incomplete solutions to environmental problems.
Prefectorial federalism would require states to comply with federal mandates
but not fund the compliance costs or provide other incentives to comply; neo-
dual federalism re-delegates power to the states with minimal federal controls
and often ignores other stakeholder interests.8
" See, e.g., Harvard Group on Risk Management Reform, Reform of Risk Regulation:
Achieving More Protection at Less Cost, 1 HUM. & ECOLOGICALRISKASSESSMENT 183, 186
(1996) [hereinafter Harvard Report] (observing that "over the past thirty years the United
States has made substantial progress in cleaning up air, water and land, in part due to the
strong regulatory presence of the federal government").
82 The debate over the failure of New Deal federalism has centered on whether federal
programs become captured by the regulated or benefited community, or whether the efforts
to isolate them from capture make them excessively cumbersome and costly to implement.
See PAUL E. PETERSON ET AL., WHEN FEDERALISM WORKS 7-10 (1986).
83 See Daniel J. Elazar, Opening the Third Century ofAmerican Federalism, 509 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 11, 12 (1990); JOHN E. THORSON, RIVER OF PROMISE, RIVER
OF PERIL: THE POLITICS OF MANAGING THE MISSOURI RIVER 116 (1994).
84 See Elazar, supra note 83, at 12; THORSON, supra note 83, at 116.
85 There are a number of modem examples of neo-dual federalism decisions related to
environmental protection. See PUD No. 1 v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700
(1994) (holding that a state may regulate releases from a FERC-licensed facility to protect
downstream water quality); California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572
(1986) (concluding that a state may impose environmental conditions on mineral extraction
in a national forest); California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978) (holding that a state
may impose environmental conditions on the use of water from a federal reservoir as long
as federal purposes are not frustrated).
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The third real change reflects the increased capacity of states to
regulate environmental quality. State willingness to enact regulation is still
questioned and varies considerably among states.86 However, over three
decades of federal enforcement and planning grants to states have helped
produce a much higher level of policymaking and enforcement competence
at the state level.87 Problems, of course, still remain, as the SDWA
experience illustrates. Between 1974 and 1986, EPA did not focus on
enforcement actions and states developed a policy of enforcing the SDWA
through technical assistance to smaller systems.88 After the 1986
Amendments, EPA civil enforcement actions accelerated, 89 but states
continued to rely on technical assistance.9" Between 1990 and 1994, states
filed an average of 1555 actions per year, whereas EPA filed an average of
2626 actions per year. 9'
III. THE 1996 AMENDMENTS: OLD AND NEW FEDERALISM COMBINED
The 1996 Amendments retain the cooperative federalism model but
modify it by simultaneously replacing the model with a new rule of reason
at the federal level and some cautious experiments with decentralized risk
assessment and management. The federal government retains the power to
set national drinking water standards,92 and the states remain the federal
government's enforcement agents.93 The Amendments also harken back to
the 1972 Clean Water Act' by creating a federally funded grant program to
improve substandard public water systems. 95 However, the Amendments
contain two new water quality protection approaches: (1) states have more
flexibility to adopt alternative protection strategies, such as watershed
86 See generally Symposium, To Devolve, or Not to Devolve?. The .(D)Evolution of
Environmental Law, 27 PAC. L.J. 1457 (1996).
87 See Harvard Report, supra note 81, at 186 (acknowledging that federal involvement
in clean water regulation over the last 30 years has been responsible in part for substantial
progress in this area).
88 See Devlin, supra note 16, at 499.
89 See id.
90 See id.
9' See id. at 500.
92 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-l(b) (West Supp. 1996).
9' See id. § 3 00g-2.
94 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. 111972).
9' See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-12 (establishing the state revolving loan fund program).
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967protection;" and (2) risk assessment is subject to a rule of reason.97
A. The Case for a Federal Role Revisited
The need for federal environmental protection seldom has been the
subject of serious political debate since the late 1960s when Congress
concluded that state air and water pollution environmental protection efforts
were inadequate. The need for uniform drinking water standards would seem
to be a settled question. Drinking water is regulated to prevent immediate
and long-term real human health risks.98 Public water system 9 consumers
have an expectation, if not a right,10° to safe drinking water whenever and
wherever a tap is opened."°1 Because the federal Constitution is widely
characterized as a negative rather than affirmative charter of liberties, there
is no right to a minimum level of environmental quality. 102 However, the
consistent regulation of drinking water to protect public health has created a
legitimate expectation that all drinking water delivered by public water
systems is safe and that the federal government has the responsibility to
96 See id. § 300g-l(b)(7)(C)(v).
9' See id. § 300g-l(b)(6).
" See H. REP. No. 93-1185, at 1 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6454, 6454
(stating that "the purpose of the [SDWA] is to assure that water supply systems serving the
public meet minimum national standards for protection of public health").
9 A line between a public and private supplier has to be drawn. The 1996 Amendments
draw it by defining a "community water system" as a PWS that "(A) serves at least 15
service connections used by year-round residents of the area served by the system; or (B)
regularly serves at least 25 year-round residents." 42 U.S.C.A. § 300f(15). The definition
of PWS, as amended by the 1996 Amendments, excludes connections by means "other than
a pipe" for purposes of meeting the 15 connection 'criterion if alternative safe water is
provided for drinking, cooking, and bathing, or the water is centrally treated at the point of
entry by the provider. See id. § 300f(4)(B). Irrigation districts that provide primarily
agricultural service are not PWSs if alternative safe water is provided for drinking, cooking,
and bathing, or the water is centrally treated at the point of entry by the provider. See id.
100 See Stephen McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water: Domestic and International
Applications, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 12 (1992) (arguing that the human right to
water "may be inferred under the basic instruments of international human rights law").
10 The counter argument is that uniform risk-minimization standards are inefficient and
unfair to those forced to take higher standards than they would choose. See, e.g., James E.
Krier, On the Topology of Uniform Environmental Standards in a Federal System-And Why
It Matters, 54 MD. L. REV. 1226 (1995).
'02 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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regulate new risks as the information develops. °3 Compared to the
protection of sustainable ecosystems, the protection of public health is
analogous to the many explicit and implicit recognitions of the right to
human dignity found in the Constitution. There is no rational reason to
duplicate the unsanitary drinking water conditions that exist in too many
developing countries throughout the world.0 4 Bottled water should remain
a choice, not a necessity.
Federal environmental standards were initially established for three
specific reasons which continue to be relevant,'05 although the reasons are
increasingly being questioned. First, federal standards were established to
prevent states with low standards, generally southern and western states, from
gaining a competitive advantage against states with higher standards.'06 This
is the so-called prevention of the race-to-the-bottom argument.'0 7 The result
was high, uniform, national technology-based risk reduction standards.'0 8
Second, federal regulation is necessary to prevent states from shifting the
"03 See Richard L. Williamson et al., Gathering Danger: The Urgent Need to Regulate
Toxic Substances That Can Bioaccumulate, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 605, 693-700 (1993) (arguing
that EPA should require PWSs to monitor levels of non-pesticide organics because
bioaccumulations of such substances may present health risks).
104 See Susan W. Putnam & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Seeking Safe Drinking Water, in RISK
VERSUs RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 124, 125 (John
D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995) (noting the lack of public water treatment
systems in developing countries and the fact that water-borne microbial diseases are
responsible for millions of deaths each year).
305 See Stewart, supra note 76, at 1225-31.
306 See id. at 1212.
[g]iven the mobility of industry and commerce, any
individual state or community may rationally decline
unilaterally to adopt high environmental standards that
entail substantial costs for industry and obstacles to
economic development for fear that the resulting
environmental gains will be more than offset by
movement of capital to other areas with lower
standards.
Id.
'07 See Revesz, supra note 9, at 1212 (explaining and critiquing the rationale, and arguing
that competition among states for industry "can be expected to produce an efficient
allocation of industrial activity among the states").
"' See, e.g., id. at 1225-26 (arguing that the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
("NAAQS") enacted in the Clean Air Act are not an optimal form of federal regulation).
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external costs of pollution to other states."°9 Third, national standards reflect
the theory that all citizens have an equal entitlement to environmental
quality."' This reason is essentially a moral argument that environmental
risk exposure is involuntary and thus protection levels should be the same for
all citizens, regardless of the cost of achieving them, and perhaps even higher
for vulnerable populations. This argument is one of the fundamental
principles of the environmental justice movement."' Drinking water
regulation, which serves to protect public health, presents a strong case for
rejection of capacity defenses and geographic variations. Federal protection
of safe drinking water is, however, more problematic under the first two
rationales.
With regard to the first rationale, there is less likely to be a race-to-
the-bottom on an issue of obvious concern to a state's own citizens. For
example, Nevada is a likely race-to-the-bottom candidate, but the Nevada
State Water Plan unequivocally states that "[i]t is the policy of the State of
Nevada that water be provided which is safe for drinking and other domestic
purposes."" 2 With respect to the second argument, states generally cannot
shift the costs of providing safe drinking water to other states except in cases
where they fail to manage watersheds or common aquifers.1 3 The third
rationale remains powerful, but different protection levels are not inconsistent
with a high safety entitlement, especially as the rationale for pollution control
109 See Stewart, supra note 76, at 1226-30 (arguing that "spillover effects" provide a
strong case for uniform federal regulation).
110 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 99-56, at 1 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1566
(stating that "the Safe Drinking Water Act was enacted in 1974 in order to assure that all
citizens served by public water systems would be provided high quality water supplies")
(emphasis added).
.. See Robert R.M. Verchick, In a Greener Voice: Feminist Theory and Environmental
Justice, 19 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 23, 63 (1996) (asserting that health studies currently used
for risk assessments fail to consider the variation in vulnerability to environmental threats
among ethnic and gender subgroups of the population).
112 DIVISION OF WATER PLANNING, STATE OF NEVADA, STATE WATER POLICY 26 (first
draft, Mar. 15, 1995).
..3 The law of interstate liability for ground water contamination is not well developed but
it seems clear that a state would be liable for contaminating an interstate aquifer. See A.
DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 10.02[4] (1988 & Supp. 1996).
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shifts from moral outrage to more considered risk judgments." 4 However,
because many environmental issues are resource allocation questions, the
need for uniform standards has been undermined.' 15
The case for uniform federal standards is no longer academic.
Ironically, at the time Congress is crafting new federalism mechanisms, the
United States Supreme Court is returning to an abstract rather than functional
view of federal regulatory authority." 6 Until the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Lopez," 17 the assumption-never vindicated by Supreme
Court precedent-was that the New Deal expansion of the commerce power
provided a sufficient basis for all federal pollution regulation." 8 Lopez held
that a federal statute exceeded the reach of the Commerce Clause for the first
time in over sixty years" 9 and thus raised the threshold federalism question:
does the federal government have any power to protect environmental
quality? Lopez returned to the formalist pre-New Deal Commerce Clause
jurisprudence of relying on indeterminate distinctions rather than on the
effects of the activity on national economic activity as defined by
Congress. 2 ° Congress' power is now limited to commercial as opposed to
"' See generally Bradley C. Bobertz, Legitimizing Pollution Through Pollution Control
Laws: Reflections on Scapegoating Theory, 73 TEX. L. REv. 711 (1995) (arguing that it is
a difficult, if not impossible, task to formulate absolute rights to environmental quality or
baselines within our constitutional tradition); Daniel A. Farber, Playing the Baseline: Civil
Rights, Environmental Law, and Statutory Interpretation, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 676, 687-91
(1991) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE (1990)).
" See Harvard Report, supra note 81, at 198-200.
116 See Morton J. Horwitz, The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without
Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REv. 32, 98 (1993) (stating that current Supreme Court
opinions reflect "no recognition that the world is rapidly changing and that the Court's
understanding of the role of law may be growing dangerously out of touch with American
Society").
"1 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
See Stephen M. Johnson, United States v. Lopez: A Misstep, but Hardly Epochal for
Federal Environmental Regulation, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 33, 57-58 (1996).
"9 See Gardbaum, supra note 69, at 795.
120 See id. (noting that Lopez perhaps "herald[s] a revival of the explicit pre-1937 position
that federalism has full constitutional status"). Professor Gardbaum suggests a more
functional judicial approach to limiting federal power by focusing on policing the legislative
process rather than by the use of abstract and unworkable categories of regulated activity.
See id. at 799. In brief, he suggests that the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 2, cl. 18, can be interpreted in light of the "hard look doctrine" of administrative law,
see, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), and the
1997]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
noncommercial activities. 1 ' Many environmental statutes such as the Clean
Water Act 122 and the Surface Mine Control and Reclamation Act 23 are tied
to the regulation of activities that have adverse impacts on interstate
commerce. 12  However, the SDWA is tied to the protection of intrastate
safety and the provision of public drinking water could be categorized as
noncommercial. 125 Nonetheless, a "court may conclude that public water
systems are commercial because they sell water and that they substantially
affect interstate commerce because they use equipment purchased from other
states or because some water users are directly engaged in interstate
commerce."'2 6 Alternatively, the Amendments could be justified as an
exercise in congressional protection of the implied right to travel. '
27
B. The Federalism Dimension of Risk:. Cost and Capacity
The current swing in federalism from a presumption in favor of the
need for uniform national regulation to the toleration of interstate diversity
has influenced the present structure of the Safe Drinking Water Act. The
politics of risk aversion created by the environmental movement have
produced two federalism "adjustments": (1) the incorporation of a rule of
reason into risk assessment; 28 and (2) increased flexibility in compliance
with federal standards, 29 sweetened with continued federal subsidization of
European Union principle of subsidiarity, to police congressional exercises of preemption.
See Gardbaum, supra note 69, at 800-02. Congress must affirmatively determine that
national regulation is required after affording full weight to the states' interest in autonomy.
See id. at 831.
12l See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633 (noting that the test to be used is "whether an intrastate
activity is commercial or non-commercial").
122 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
123 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994).
124 See John P. Dwyer, The Commerce Clause and the Limits of Congressional Authority
to Regulate the Environment, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,421, 10,427 (1995).
121 See id.
126 Id.
127 For an overview of the Supreme Court's development of the right to travel doctrine,
see 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.38 (2d ed. 1992).
12 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-l(b)(6) (West Supp. 1996).
129 See e.g., id. § 300g-l(b)(7)(C)(v) (allowing states to establish alternative treatment
requirements to filtration in certain circumstances).
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the provision of safe drinking water.13 ° The net result is that advocates of
uniform standards bear a higher burden of justification than in the past, but
deviations still remain the exception.
The 1996 Amendments partially reflect this shift from first to second
generation environmental protection. Some of the final compromises reflect
the familiar Miltonian struggle between zero risk standards and benefit-cost
analysis. For example, the bill expressly authorizes the consideration of
consumer willingness to pay for reductions in health risks in benefit-cost
analysis.' The long battle over the Republican and Democratic bills
ultimately reflected a consensus that the establishment of drinking water
standards is a problem in risk assessment and that the numbers produced by
risk assessment are not always real;' thus there is a need for the rule of
reason, which incorporates geographic differences in risk exposure when a
strong case can be made to depart from feasibility-based national standards.
The protection of safe drinking water is no different from another pollution
problem. The problem is: what is an acceptable level of risk? This is a
mixed scientific-value judgment where there are no correct answers. The
debate is about orders of magnitude of enhanced or reduced risk and takes
place under conditions of extreme uncertainty.'33 The debate is usually about
extremely high and abstract risk reduction levels rather than taking obvious
and reasonably priced steps to avoid exposure to known risks. For example,
EPA set the MCLG for lead at zero'34 but declined to set an MCL because it
determined that a stringent MCL, which would reflect the public health goal
of the SDWA, would not be feasible.'
The Safe Drinking Water Act imposes substantial compliance costs
130 See e.g., id. § 300j-12.
... See id. § 300g-l(b)(3)(C)(iii).
"3 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
... See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1211, 1217 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (holding that EPA's adoption of a non-zero MCLG for vinylidene chloride was
within the realm of agency discretion because evidence of carcinogenicity was "sparse and
equivocal").
134 See 40 C.F.R. § 141.51 (1996).
3 See Maximum Contaminant Level Goals and National Primary Drinking Water
Regulations for Lead and Copper, 56 Fed. Reg. 26,460, 26,477 (1991). EPA's refusal to set
an MCL for lead was upheld in federal court. See American Water Works Ass'n v. EPA,
40 F.3d 1266, 1270-71 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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on the regulated community. 3 6 However, the community differs from the
other major environmental programs, the Clean Air Act, 137 Clean Water
Act, 138 RCRA, 139 and CERCLA, 4° because the "regulated community" is
extremely diverse. The SDWA applies to major municipal drinking water
systems as well as to the myriad of small "mom and pop" systems.14' EPA's
focus on technological detectability makes it financially infeasible for many
small systems to comply with required contaminant levels and filtration
requirements, and thus the policy has created substantial pressures for relief
from compliance with low risk standards. 42 In effect, states and local
suppliers have raised a capacity defense to federal standards.
"Capacity defense" is a term used to characterize the arguments of
developing countries that they should not have to comply with high
international environmental standards. 43 The defense, an outgrowth of
developing country equity claims, argues either that a country lacks the
resources to implement the standard or that it can trade-off short term
economic benefits against long term environmental risk reduction and thus
is entitled to adopt a lower environmental standard.14 4 One of the emerging
principles of international environmental law posits that states have common
36 A recent study indicates that compliance costs with the 1986 Amendments ranges from
$1.5 to $2.4 billion per year from 1993 to 2000. See HARVEY S. JAMES, JR., IMPLEMENTING
A REGULATORY BUDGET: ESTIMATING THE MANDATED PRIVATE EXPENDITURE OF THE
CLEAN AIR ACT AND THE SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT AMENDMENTS 19 (Ctr. Study Am.
Bus. Working Paper No. 161, 1996).
137 42 U.S.C. §§ 74 01-7671q (1994).
138 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
139 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k.
140 Id. §§ 9601-9675.
4 ' The national primary drinking water regulations established by the SDWA apply to all
public water systems. See id. § 300f. A PWS is any system that provides water for public
consumption and has at least 15 service connections or regularly serves at least 25
individuals. Id. § 300f(4).
142 See, e.g., Small Systems Need Broad-Based Assistance to Comply with Law, Officials
at All Levels Say, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2367 (Mar. 25, 1988); States Constrained by Lack
of Funds to Meet Federal Standards, GAO Says, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 634 (Aug. 13, 1993)
(noting that state estimates of costs of testing for contaminants range from $2,500 to $10,000
for each set of analyses).
141 See 1 PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 219-20
(1995).
144 See id.
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but differentiated duties to comply with environmental mandates.'45 This
principle is one of the many efforts, united under the umbrella concept of
sustainable development, to bridge the gap between developed and
developing nations.'46 It recognizes that states have unequal resources to
devote to environmental protection and perhaps that the level of
environmental protection can be lower than adopted by developed
countries. 147
The 1996 Amendments do not follow the international analogy to its
logical conclusion and make capacity a permanent defense to compliance
with national standards. The Amendments impose a duty on all states, under
penalty of losing twenty percent of its federal allotment, to develop a capacity
development strategy for sub-standard systems. 48 More importantly, the
Amendments apply second generation federal financing techniques
developed for public sewage treatment systems to purification systems. The
Clean Water Act initially provided grants to finance publicly owned
treatment works ("POTWs"); 149 but too much money was lost in a non-cost
effective manner, so Congress switched to revolving loans. 5 ° The
Amendments authorize federal grants to create state revolving loan funds to
provide monies to bring public water systems up to the standards imposed by
the SDWA. 5' State loan funds may be used for direct loans or as a source of
security for leveraged loans, 1 2 and are subject to stringent technical,
managerial, and financial capability standards.'53 In addition to capacity
"'s See id. at 217-18.
146 See id. at 205-08.
141 See id. at 217.
148 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-12(a)(1)(G)(I) (West Supp. 1996).
149 See 33 U.S.C. § 1281(g) (Supp. 111972).
"5 See 33 U.S.C. § 1381 (Supp. V 1987).
151 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-12. Congress appropriated $1.3 billion for fiscal year 1997 but
limited the use of the monies for capitalization grants in conflict with the broader purposes
authorized in the Amendments. See Drinking Water Program Gets $1.3 Billion for State
Revolving Loan Fund in Money Bill, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1223 (Oct. 4, 1996).
152 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-12(a)(2).
... See id. § 300j-12(a)(3)(A)(i). If it is found that a state does not have primary
enforcement responsibility, the Amendments provide that the state allotment shall not be
deposited in a state fund but must be reserved as needed by the Administrator for public
enforcement. See id. § 300j-12(a)(1)(F). Any excess funds will be reallotted to states with
primary enforcement responsibility. See id.
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construction, the loan funds may be used for source water protection. '54 The
increased emphasis on source water protection is one of the major
innovations of the Amendments. Disadvantaged communities are eligible for
subsidies including loan forgiveness.'55 Direct grants are also available to
states to develop source water protection partnership programs.'56
Other place-based protection source water strategies are authorized
by the Amendments. Place-based geohydrology defenses include: utilization
of point-of-use treatment systems for small water systems; 157 substitution of
effective watershed management for filtration;' 58 and relief from monitoring
requirements, other than for microbial contaminants, disinfectants, and
disinfection by-products, or corrosion by-products, when earlier monitoring
failed to detect the contaminant in the ground or surface water and the state
certifies that the hydrology of the area makes it unlikely that the contaminant
will be detected by further monitoring.' The Act retains the non-
technological source protection options of the sole source aquifer
demonstration program 6 ° and adds the possible substitution of watershed
management for filtration by a state exercising primary enforcement
responsibility. 6' A state's decision to permit watershed management as an
alternative to filtration is subject to approval by the EPA Administrator. 62
EPA may consider the protection afforded by watershed management in
deciding whether a system is required to filter surface water supplies.'63 The
watershed management alternative is of immediate benefit to New York City
because it can save several billion dollars by protecting its Catskill and
,5 See id. § 300j-12(g)(2).
' See id. § 300j-12(d)(1).
156 See id. § 300j- 14(a). States are required to adopt source water assessment protection
programs that must delineate the areas from which public water systems draw supplies and
identify the regulated contaminants which may present a threat to public health. See id. §
300j-13(a).
's See id. § 300g-l(b)(4)(E)(ii).
158 See id. § 300g-l(b)(7)(C)(v).
,5 See id. § 300g-7(a), (b).
160 See id. § 300h-6.
161 See id. § 300g-l(b)(7)(C)(v).
162 See id.
163 See id. § 300g-l(b)(7)(C)(i); see also Sarah J. Meyland, Land Use & the Protection of
Drinking Water Supplies, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 563, 569-71 (1993).
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Delaware watersheds as an alternative to filtration. 16 4
C. Congressional Risk Assessment
1. Radon and Chlorine By-products
Federalism can be served when Congress acts to resolve risk level
controversies. This assertion is, of course, a slippery slope because Congress
has a tendency to seek quick solutions to specific risks that excite public
concern regardless of the scientific merits of the scientific reports of the case
for regulation. Nevertheless, there is a legitimate role for Congress when the
science behind the particular substance raises serious questions about the
need for any regulation, the economic costs of compliance with a
conservative standard are high in relation to likely benefits, and the issue is
of nationwide concern rather than of particular interest to a state or industry.
Congress' resolution of the chlorine and radon debates illustrate the strengths
of congressional risk assessment when these conditions prevail.
One of the major drinking water issues in recent years has been the
standards for chlorination of public drinking water supplies.'65 Chlorination
of drinking water supplies was one of the major public health advances of
this century,'66 but in recent years there is some evidence that chlorine by-
products pose cancer risks.'67 The recent concern that the longstanding,
economical, and effective practice of adding chlorine to drinking water to
eliminate microbial diseases poses cancer risks illustrates the argument that
safe drinking water levels depend on the risk to be minimized.'68 As a recent
analysis of the problem concludes: "[c]oncern over the potential
carcinogenicity of chlorine and its by-products has pushed society to explore
other disinfection alternatives. But would these options be worse than the
'64 See Meyland, supra note 163, at 569; New York City Will Get Interim Approval for
Watershed Protection Plan, EPA Says, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1147 (Sept. 20, 1996). EPA
announced on September, 10, 1996, that it intended to issue in December, 1996, an interim
determination that a watershed protection plan for the city's 2,000 square mile watershed is
adequate to avoid filtration. See id. at 1147-48.
161 See Putnam & Wiener, supra note 104, at 124.
166 See id. at 125-26.
167 See id. at 127-32.
168 See id. at 141-45 (comparing health risks of microbial diseases and chlorine by-
products).
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process they replace? None of the chemical alternatives has both the biocidal
and residual properties of chlorine, nor many of its secondary benefits."' 69 In
the end, however, Congress erred on the side of safety and preserved the
Administrator's power to issue previously proposed disinfectant and
disinfection by-product rules.
70
Congress made the opposite decision with respect to radon. Radon
is a gas produced by decaying radium;'7 radium is the result of the decay of
uranium-238.172 This element occurs naturally in granite, shale and
phosphate-bearing formations and the gas filters up to the surface through
cracks and fissures. 73 Exposure can occur through air'74 or water.175 Most
of the regulatory efforts have been focused on the establishment of indoor air
standards in the range of four picocuries,176 but the Senate version of the
Amendments had a similarly conservative standard for drinking water.
77
Since a 1986 EPA study presented an estimate that radon is responsible for
up to 20,000 lung cancer deaths annually in the United States, 78 that statistic
has been widely quoted. 179 A compilation of studies of Japanese atomic
bomb victims, however, failed to reveal any link between radon exposure and
cancer at radiation levels below 200 rads. 80 A study of cancer rates in
uranium miners by the National Research Council of the National Academy
of Sciences showed increased cancer risk from exposure to very high levels
of radon. 81' However, the link between cancer risk and radon exposure at low
radiation levels is inconclusive at best and highly suspect. 82 In the end,
Congress did not set drinking water standards for radon. The 1996
169 Id. at 147.
7' See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-l(b)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1996).
171 See LEONARD A. COLE, ELEMENT OF RISK: THE POLITICS OF RADON 8 (1993).
172 See id. at 8-9.
'71 See id. at 8.
174 See id. at 8-9.
175 See PROCTOR, supra note 79, at 197 (noting that radon can be released from water).
176 See COLE, supra note 171, at 83-87.
177 See S. REP. No. 104-169, at 15 (1995) (proposing a standard of 3,000 picocuries that
takes into account the greater density of water compared to air).
171 U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO RADON 2 (1st ed. 1986).
171 See, e.g., Robert D. King, The Legal Implications of Residential Radon Contamination,
18 WM. & MARY J. ENVTL. L. 107, 109 (1993).
180 See COLE, supra note 171, at 26-27.
181 See id. at 27-28.
182 See id. at 28-3 1.
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Amendments require EPA to withdraw its proposed standard of 300
picocuries per liter.'83 The Amendments further provide that a primary
drinking water regulation for radon can only be proposed after a National
Academy of Sciences risk assessment study. 18 4
2. "Good Science" and "Good Economics"
The Amendments seek to increase the use of science and benefit-cost
analysis in future national standards and MCLs and MCLGs. Science
remains a widely respected source of legitimate environmental standards, but
there is no agreement on what constitutes acceptable science for purposes of
setting environmental standards. In his recent book Cancer Wars,'85 Robert
Proctor makes a useful distinction between two types of conservatism in risk
assessment debates.'86 Public health conservatism is the environmental
movement's response to the problem of scientific uncertainty.'87 Chemicals
are suspected of causing serious adverse health effects but causal links cannot
be clearly established by the existing state of knowledge.'88 To bridge the
gap, a precautionary approach which allows the regulator to err
"conservatively" on the side of safety was proposed and legitimated by the
courts.'89 This precautionary approach has been opposed by advocates of the
conservative use of "good science": "[t]o estimate a hazard 'conservatively'
in the scientific sense means taking care not to overestimate a hazard."' 9 ° The
modem problem with risk assessment is that the concrete costs of public
health conservatism are often too great compared to the abstract benefits
achieved. '
Although the search for an appropriate remedy for reformed risk
assessment has occupied a great deal of intellectual and political energy, the
183 See H.R. REP. No. 104-632, at 4-5 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1366, 1367-
68.
184 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-l(b)(13)(B) (West Supp. 1996)
185 PROCTOR, supra note 79.
186 See id. at 261-65.
'8 See id. at 264.
'8 See id. at 257-61.
189 Two leading cases are Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (en
banc), and Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).
190 PROCTOR, supra note 79, at 262.
191 See, e.g., Harvard Report, supra note 81, at 194.
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remedy remains elusive. Recently, there seems to be an increasing consensus
among risk "experts" that risk assessment needs a mid-course correction in
the form of a rule of reason based on both economics and science.9 2 Two
factors drive the need for a correction. First, the bedrock assumption of toxic
risk regulation that there is no safe threshold for exposure limits from most
chemicals is eroding. The draft report of the Commission on Risk
Assessment and Management summarizes the evolving theories on the cause
of cancer: "[t]he distinction between 'nonthreshold' carcinogens and
'threshold' noncarcinogens is increasingly blurred. The standard assumption
that all carcinogens are mutagens and that their dose-response relationships
can be modeled by assuming low-dose linearity is inconsistent with a variety
of 'secondary' carcinogenesis now identified." '193
Second, and related to the first factor, these scientific developments
reinforce the argument that greater attention be given to cost and benefits. A
full benefit-cost analysis is impossible, but it is possible to achieve a better
or "reasonable relationship between the incremental costs and the incremental
benefits"' 94 of public health rules. For example, the World Health
Organization has concluded that "there has been little convincing evidence
of carcinogenicity of ingested asbestos in epidemiological studies of
populations with drinking-water supplies containing high concentrations of
asbestos."' 95
The Amendments attempt to solve the tension between high
expectations and the anticipated results of a benefit-cost analysis by allowing
risk trade-offs based on "the best available, peer-reviewed science." '96 The
Administrator is no longer subject to the duty to regulate twenty-five
contaminants every three years,' 97 but he or she must limit new unregulated
candidates for MCLGs to those "that present the greatest public health
192 See id. at 193 (recommending that "Congress should require regulations to achieve a
reasonable relationship between costs and benefits when regulating risks").
' COMMISSION ON RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT, RISK ASSESSMENT AND
RISK MANAGEMENT IN REGULATORY DEcISION-MAKING 19-20 (draft report, June 13, 1996).
194 Harvard Report, supra note 81, at 193.
195 WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 37, at 42.
196 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-l(b)(3)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1996).
197 See Pub. L. No. 104-182 § 102(b), 110 Stat. 1613, 1620 (1996) (providing that 42
U.S.C. § 300g-I(b)(3)(C) (1994) is superseded by § 102(a) of the Amendments).
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concern,"'198 subject to an environmental justice control provision99 The
Administrator must consider the impact on vulnerable populations who face
enhanced risks from exposure to the prospective MCLG contaminants.200
Interim national primary drinking water regulations must address "an urgent
threat to public health."' 0' All actions must be based on "the best available,
peer-reviewed science and supporting studies conducted in accordance with
sound and objective scientific practices,""2 2 with, inter alia, appropriate upper
and lower risk estimates.20 3 Furthermore, when EPA proposes adopting new
MCLs it must consider and analyze "[t]he incremental costs and benefits
associated with each alternative maximum contaminant level. 20 4
The Amendments directly reflect the concept of risk trade-offs
developed by Senator Daniel Moynihan of New York.2 5 The Administrator
may depart from setting the MCL at the technically feasible level "if the
technology, treatment techniques, and other means used to determine the
feasible level would result in an increase in the health risk from drinking
water, '206 either by increasing the concentration of other contaminants or
198 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-l(b)(l)(C).
199 See id.
20 See id. The Amendments mandate a study to identify populations who face greater risk
than the general population from contaminated drinking water. See id. § 300j- 18(a).
201 Id. § 300g-l(b)(1)(D).
202 Id. § 300g-l(b)(3)(A)(i).
203 See id. § 300g-l(b)(3)(B)(iii). Congress has enshrined the equation of good science
with peer-reviewed science articulated by the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (abandoning the Frye test and allowing admission of scientific
evidence "if indicia of reliability, such as peer-review, are present"). I have previously
criticized the Court's narrow formulation of "good science." See A. Dan Tarlock, The Futile
Search for Environment Laws Based on "Good Science," I INT'L J. BIOSCIENCES & L. 9
(1996).
204 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-l(b)(3)(C)(i)(IV).
205 Senator Moynihan first introduced the concept of balancing scientific certainty and
benefit-cost analysis in 1991. See Environmental Risk Reduction Act of 1991, S. 2132,
102d Cong. After the bill failed to be enacted, Senator Moynihan reintroduced the bill in
1993. See Environmental Risk Reduction Act of 1993, S. 110, 103d Cong.; 141 CONG. REC.
S373, S373 (Jan. 4, 1995). This bill was also not enacted into law. See id. at S373. As he
introduced the follow-on bill, Environmental Risk Evaluation Act of 1995, S. 123, 104th
Cong., Senator Moynihan stated: "A far better legislative question to ask EPA to address
when setting environmental regulations is 'How much are we willing to pay to reduce risk
by what amount, given all the uncertainties about risks, costs and benefits of control' rather
than 'What is the safe level of exposure."' 141 CONG. REc., at S373.
206 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-l(b)(5)(A).
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interfering with the efficacy of drinking water treatment.2°7 The Amendments
mandate that the Administrator must set the treatment techniques or MCLs
to "minimize the overall risk of adverse health effects by balancing the risk
from the contaminant and the risk from other contaminants. 2 8 In short,
benefit-cost analysis is now a possible defense to compliance with feasibility-
based standards. The latter remain the norm, but it is now possible to depart
from feasibility when the compliance costs and expected benefits are
substantially disproportionate due to local conditions or other factors.
3. Local Enforcement
Citizen enforcement of environmental laws is one of the great
contributions of United States law to domestic and global environmental
protection. Citizen enforcement has long been a part of the SDWA,20 9 but the
Amendments expand it by linking it to information disclosure or "the right
to know. '210 The expansion of citizen enforcement can also be characterized
as a federalism response because it gives those most impacted by a risk
assessment the necessary information to make a more informed choice.211
The basic problem with state administration was the lack of enforcement
capability. The Act contains the usual citizen suit provision, but the
Amendments augment citizen suits with a community disclosure program. 12
Suppliers must notify their customers of any failure to comply with
applicable MCLs or tests proscribed by national primary drinking water
regulations213 and, where the violation has the potential to have serious
adverse effects on human health as a result of short-term exposure, "provide
a clear and readily understandable explanation of the violation. '214 Suppliers
also must provide annual consumer confidence reports to their customers,
2 15
207 Id.
208 See id. § 300g-l(b)(5)(B)(i).
209 Congress enacted the citizen suit provision as part of the 1974 SDWA. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 300j-8 (Supp. IV 1974).
210 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-l(b)(3)(B).
211 See generally Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138
U. PA. L. REv. 1027 (1990) (providing an analysis of the problem of democratizing risk
assessment).
212 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-3(c).
213 See id. § 300g-3(c)(1)(A)(i).
214 Id. § 300g-3(c)(2)(C).
215 See id. § 300g-3(c)(4)(A).
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although it will be at least two years until EPA publishes a disclosure
manual.2t 6
CONCLUSION
The 1996 Amendments represent a cautious evolution of federal,
state, and local relations in United States pollution control law. The first
generation of environmental laws enacted in the 1970s can be analogized to
a parent with a young teenager who will not clean his or her room or practice
the piano. All delegations of authority are characterized by clear and uniform
standards and strict compliance deadlines. The assumption is that strong
parental guidance, command and control, and possibly "preemption" of the
child's authority is necessary to compel effective action. As the child
matures, it is sometimes possible to experiment with performance standards
that allow the child some discretion to decide how and when to perform the
assigned task. This balance is what the 1996 Amendments seek to achieve.
Compliance with strict national drinking water standards that minimize
public health risks through the application of technology remains the norm.
However, states and local water suppliers now have some discretion to use
alternative methods of protecting end-of-the-tap supplies, such as source
water protection, and strict "zero" risk standards can be modified when a
strong showing of scientific and economic irrationality can be established.
The Amendments are a significant federalism experiment and bear close
scrutiny to see if the 1996 SDWA reforms can be applied to other pollution
control and prevention programs.
216 See Base Requirements for Consumer Reports Under Development by Drinking Water
Office, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1146 (Sept. 20, 1996).
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